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Commentary · September 2026

The Future of Health Financing: The Destination Is Clearer Than the Transition

I recently read The Future of Health Financing, the new policy brief from the Partnership for International Politics and Diplomacy for Health. It is a thoughtful and timely contribution to a debate that has moved very quickly since the financing shocks of 2025.

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I recently read The Future of Health Financing, the new policy brief from the Partnership for International Politics and Diplomacy for Health. It is a thoughtful and timely contribution to a debate that has moved very quickly since the financing shocks of 2025.

I agree with much of its central framing: domestic resources as the foundation, external assistance as a more strategic and time-bound complement, and global functions financed collectively. I also think it is right to frame this as a question of power and accountability, not simply money. The value of the brief, for me, is that it makes the emerging destination clear enough to expose the questions that still sit between the current system and the one being proposed. Reading it left me thinking less about the destination than about the transition itself.

That transition is no longer theoretical. WHO reported in late 2025 that abrupt external financing cuts were already disrupting essential services in many low- and middle-income countries – while those same countries were being asked to protect services, reprioritise spending and accelerate the shift towards domestically driven financing, all at once.

That is precisely why the mechanics matter. Three questions seem particularly important.

First, does the arithmetic close?

World Bank projections suggest government health spending can grow materially through 2030: by about 14% in low-income countries and 17% in lower-middle-income countries between 2024 and 2030. Yet the same projections indicate that, as development assistance falls, combined government and donor spending will still be lower in 2030 than in 2024 in more than 80% of low-income countries and about 40% of lower-middle-income countries.

That tension matters. Domestic mobilisation is possible, and in many countries it is already happening. The harder question is whether it can happen at the scale and speed implied by transition timelines — particularly where debt service, a narrow tax base, weak growth, the cost of capital and competing public priorities already constrain fiscal space. The brief itself recognises that domestic resources cannot simply materialise overnight, and that national financing choices are inseparable from international conditions around debt and access to capital.

The question, then, is not whether domestic financing should become more important. It is what happens in the interval between declining external finance and a domestic base capable of sustaining the same — or a better — level of service. In practice, that gap will be filled by some combination of new revenue, reprioritisation inside government, efficiency gains, concessional finance, service redesign and some continued external support. The relative weight of each will differ sharply across countries.

This matters most because the countries most dependent on external financing are often those with the least room for rapid fiscal substitution. A transition can be directionally right and still be badly timed. If external financing falls faster than domestic systems can replace it, the adjustment does not wait for the financing architecture to catch up. It appears in programmes, payrolls, supply chains and ultimately in access to care.

The fiscal arithmetic therefore needs to be read not only as a medium-term sustainability question, but as a sequencing question.

Second, does changing the source of finance necessarily change accountability?

The argument for domestic financing is partly political. Governments that depend more heavily on revenue raised from citizens may face stronger incentives to respond to them, because taxation creates a relationship in which public revenue and public expectations become visibly connected. That idea has a substantial political-economy literature behind it. Wilson Prichard’s work on tax bargaining in sub-Saharan Africa is particularly useful because it shows both the potential of this relationship and its contingency: taxation can strengthen responsiveness and accountability, but it does not do so automatically or uniformly.

That distinction becomes important as the composition of external finance changes. Grants and loans are not equivalent. A loan creates a future fiscal obligation, often on concessional terms, and can be an important instrument in a transition. But during the transition period it still provides resources that have not been raised from current domestic taxpayers, while part of the government’s obligation runs to an external creditor. The source of finance changes; the direction of accountability may change too, but not necessarily in a simple or immediate way.

So the institutional question is not simply who pays? It is: what actually converts greater fiscal responsibility into greater accountability to citizens?

If sovereignty is partly about who can set priorities, who can challenge those priorities and to whom public institutions must explain their choices, then changing the financing mix is only one part of the story. Budget institutions, transparency, political competition, legislative oversight, the visibility of taxation and public trust all shape whether a more domestic financing model produces a more citizen-accountable health system.

This is not an argument against multilateral lending, nor against the broader shift the brief proposes. It is a reason to keep the accountability question open as the financing mix evolves. If the old architecture often pulled accountability upward towards funders, the new architecture should be judged partly by whether accountability genuinely moves downward and outward towards citizens – not simply by whether the domestic share of financing rises.

Third, what do we mean by “ready” to transition?

This may be the most important unresolved issue. The brief calls for strategic and time-bound assistance, country-led transition plans and dates for handing over externally financed functions.

But a date is not a condition. What would allow a government — or a partner — to say credibly that the conditions for handover have been met? And what would allow either side to say, with equal legitimacy, not yet?

The answer cannot rest only on whether a transition plan exists, whether a committee has been constituted or whether a financing commitment appears in a budget. Those are important signals, but they are not the same as operational readiness.

The deeper question is whether the financing-to-service chain actually works when responsibility moves: whether appropriated resources are released, whether procurement continues, whether salaries and recurrent costs are financed, whether data still move, whether medicines still arrive, and whether patients still receive care.

That is why budget execution deserves more attention in this debate. The World Bank estimates that low- and lower-middle-income countries underspend approved health budgets by an average of about 13% — roughly US$4 per capita. The causes include cash-release constraints, fragmented and unpredictable disbursement, central expenditure controls and other public-financial-management bottlenecks. An approved budget is not the same thing as executable resources, and weak execution should not automatically be read as a Ministry of Health competence problem.

This is also where I would resist the temptation to answer the readiness problem by inventing another universal scorecard. The unresolved issue is more fundamental: what evidence should count, how should it be interpreted in different institutional settings, and who has the authority to pause, modify or reverse a handover when financing and service conditions do not support it?

Readiness is partly technical, but it is also a governance question. The power to declare a system “ready” is itself part of the power relationship the new financing architecture is trying to change.

And when the financing gap is not closed, the residual does not disappear. It shows up as higher out-of-pocket spending, foregone care, longer waits, shortages, reduced service intensity or lower quality. The 2025 WHO–World Bank Global Monitoring Report on UHC is an important reminder that financial protection and service coverage have to be read together. A transition that raises the domestic share of spending while absolute resources fall, services deteriorate or households absorb more of the cost would look successful in one indicator and fail in the outcomes that matter.

Readiness, then, is less a box to tick than a judgement about whether responsibility can move without creating an avoidable break in the chain from public finance to service delivery. The evidence required for that judgement will not be identical across countries, and it may be particularly difficult in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where national systems, humanitarian channels and local organisations may all remain necessary at the same time.

What should stay collective

The brief also raises a parallel question about functions that should remain shared. Greater country ownership should not be read as a requirement to nationalise every function.

Pooled procurement, market shaping, surveillance, research and some emergency capabilities derive part of their value from operating at regional or global scale. The governance question is how to preserve that scale while changing who has voice, who pays and who decides. In that sense, the paper’s three-part architecture does more than propose a financing model. It opens a broader conversation about where authority should sit at different levels of the health system.

The emerging architecture is increasingly coherent about where global health financing should go. I am less sure we have yet specified, with the same clarity, how countries get there safely – and who gets to decide when they are ready. That, to me, is where the next stage of the debate belongs.

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